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Summary: In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when the
manager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previous results, we show
that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjusted contracts do provide portfolio
managers with incentives to gather information. The risk-averse manager's optimal
eort is an increasing function of her share in the portfolio's return. This result aects
the risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The rst best, purely risk-sharing
contract is proved to be suboptimal. Using numerical methods we show that the man-
ager's share in the portfolio return is higher than the rst best share. Additionally,
this deviation is shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)
larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint is relaxed the optimal
contract converges towards the rst best risk sharing contract.
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Investors delegate portfolio decisions to managers because of their alleged skill
in gathering superior information on movements in security prices. When the man-
ager's research activity is not observed, the investor could face problems associated
with moral hazard. Then, it is in the investor's interest to provide the manager with
incentives to gather better information. In studying the nature of such incentive con-
tracts, past literature has assumed that the manager's portfolio choice is unbounded.
Yet, we seldom observe environments where the manager's portfolio choice is totally
\unrestricted." Practices like borrowing money, margin purchases, short-selling or
investment in derivative securities are usually restricted.1 Our purpose is to study
the eect of such constraints on incentive provision.
We assume that the manager's ability to short-sell is restricted and that investors
have to cope with moral hazard. Our primary interest is in the impact of short sell-
ing restrictions on the power of incentives provided by linear symmetric contracts.2
We report three main results. First (Corollary 2), linear performance-adjusted con-
tracts do provide managers with incentives for gathering better information. Second
(Proposition 4), we show that the manager's share in the portfolio return is dierent
from the rst best.3 Third, using numerical methods, we show that the manager's
share in the optimal portfolio is higher than the rst best and decreases as we re-
lax the leverage constraint. We also present some additional results. In a scenario
without moral hazard, but with short selling restrictions: (i) under the optimal linear
contract, the manager's share in the portfolio is equal to the rst best (Proposition
4); (ii) linear contracts dominate quadratic contracts (Proposition 6, in Appendix
A). With moral hazard and short selling restrictions, numerical methods show that,
quadratic contracts dominate linear contracts only for certain parameter values (Table
2 in Appendix A).
We take portfolio restrictions as given and focus on the impact of their variation
on optimal incentives. These restrictions can be thought as internally imposed by
1Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2001) document that approximately 70% of mutual
funds explicitly state (in Form N-SAR handed in to the SEC) that short-selling is not permitted.
This gure rises to above 90% when the restriction is on margin purchases. These percentages are
quite robust among dierent categories of funds, sorted by objective (value/growth, small-cap/large-
cap), fund age, management type (single manager/multiple managers) and load charges (front/back
load or no load). Koski and Ponti (1999) examine the use of derivative securities in a large sample
of mutual funds. They report that 79% of equity mutual funds make no use of derivatives whatsoever
(either futures or options).
2Linear contracts have a xed payment component or asset-based fee and a component, the
incentive fee, which depends on the performance (possibly relative to some benchmark index) of
the portfolio. With symmetric or \fulcrum" contracts the manager receives a bonus or a penalty,
depending on whether the portfolio return was above or below the benchmark return. On the other
side, under the bonus schedule, the penalty is bounded below a given value, usually zero.
3A \rst best" corresponds to the situation where there is no moral hazard, i.e. the manager's
eort is observable and veriable by a third party, and there is no restriction on short selling.funds or externally imposed by regulating agencies. We model these restrictions as
constraints on short-selling. The motivation is two-fold. First, according to Almaz an
et al (2001), this is the most frequent restriction together with margin purchases.
Second, our assumption can be seen as a simplication of the scenario where prices
change as the manager borrows or lends large amounts. Assuming that the manager's
opportunity set is bounded implies that she faces innite prices for borrowing over a
certain limit. Alternately, as is often done in the contract literature, this amounts to
assuming bankruptcy constraints for the manager.
Our main focus is on the incentives provided by linear symmetric contracts. Such
contracts need not be optimal in the domain of all contracts and quadratic contracts
are known to perform better than linear contracts in certain environments. We com-
pare linear and quadratic contracts in Appendix A.4 There are two reasons for focusing
on linear contracts in the main text of the paper. First, from an institutional point
of view, the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) restricts compensation contracts
in the mutual fund industry to only linear symmetric contracts.5 Second, restrict-
ing our domain to symmetric linear contracts provides us with the very well known
\no-incentive" benchmark. When no restrictions on short-selling exist, Stoughton
(1993) and Admati and Peiderer (1997) have shown that linear (fulcrum) contracts
fail to aect the manager's decision to gather better information. In other words,
the manager's optimal eort choice is independent of the contract she receives from
the investor.6 As a consequence, the only role for the linear contract is to split the
risk eciently between the manager and the investor: a higher risk aversion of the
former relative to the later would then imply no performance adjustment component
in managers fees. We call the pure risk sharing optimal contract, the rst best. Re-
stricting the domain to linear contracts allows us to understand the reason behind
the \no-incentive" result.
In contrast to the \no-incentive" result, our rst result asserts that under moral
hazard and nite short-selling bounds, linear contracts do provide the manager with
incentives to gather better information. Notice that both assumptions are necessary
for this result. With moral hazard but no short-selling bounds, the no-incentive
result prevails. With short-selling constraints but no moral hazard, incentives for
performance are not required. Hence, as we show in Proposition 4, the rst best split
4We thank an anonymous referee for persuading us to carry out this exercise
5The Investment Advisers Act (as amended in 1970) allows the use of relative performance adjust-
ment fees to compensate portfolio managers in the mutual fund industry. In 1986, the Department
of Labor approved the use of performance fees for ERISA-governed pension funds. In both cases,
the fee must be a fulcrum fee.
6Stoughton studies \raw" performance-adjusted contracts while Admati and Peiderer analyze
contracts that include \relative" performance fees. In a \raw" performance contract the return on
the benchmark index is xed, as say the portfolio's previous highest return (\high water-mark"). In a
\relative" performance contract the return on the benchmark index is stochastic, as say the contem-
porary return on the S&P 500. The non-incentive result arises regardless of whether performance
is measured in raw or relative terms.
2is optimal.
The intuition behind our rst result is as follows. With no short selling constraints
the manager is able to undo the eects of incentives by appropriate modications of
the portfolio. Hence, we get the \no incentive" result. With nite short selling
bounds, no matter how large they are, the manager anticipates that with positive
probability she shall not be able to form the portfolio of her choice. This leads
her to reduce eort in gathering better information. Under such circumstances, by
increasing the incentive fee the investor expands the manager's portfolio set, thereby
partially undoing the eects imposed by short-selling bounds. This in turn, provides
her with incentives for spending more eort.
Given the principal's utility function, the cost of increasing eort through linear
contracts may be too high. As a result, the principal may simply desire to share
risk through the rst best sharing rule and ignore eort inducement. Our second
result rules out such behavior: the rst best sharing rule is never optimal. This
result is interesting in the light of a recent paper. Elton, Gruber and Blake (2001)
document that although less than 2% of US mutual funds use (fulcrum) incentive
fees, they account for 10.5% of the total assets under management. Furthermore,
the rate of growth for those funds is higher than that for the industry in general.
Though, on average, these funds do not earn positive incentive fees, their risk-adjusted
performance is higher than that for other funds, suggesting a tendency to induce more
eort from managers in place. We interpret these ndings as evidence in favor of our
model's predictions: at least for large mutual funds, symmetric incentive contracts
may be better for the rm than no incentive contracts (recall that by regulation,
mutual funds are constrained to oer linear contracts).
We are not able to derive closed form solutions for the optimal linear contract.7
Using numerical methods, we show that the manager's share in the portfolio is higher
than in the rst best. Importantly, this share converges to the rst best level as
the bounds on short selling get relaxed. Thus, the \no-incentive" result is a special
case. This nal result can be interpreted as follows. In the constrained scenario,
the performance adjustment fee plays an additional role beyond risk sharing, namely
eort inducement. When the short-selling bounds shrink (making the restriction
tighter) the volatility of the portfolio decreases as well since fewer \extreme" portfolios
are feasible. If the investor does not increase the performance adjustment fee the
manager will be under-exposed to management risk. As a consequence, eort will
also decrease. The risk sharing and the eort inducement arguments are aligned in
the same direction: the optimal incentive fee increases above the rst best value.
This eect is enhanced by the manager's risk-aversion: given a certain level of short-
selling, the (percentage) deviation from the rst best share increases as the manager's
risk-aversion augments.
Our paper is concerned with deriving the optimal contract in the class of all linear
7The optimal program of the investor requires that we integrate over a Chi-square distribution
of degree one. To our knowledge, such integration can only be be performed numerically.
3contracts. More recently, using the rst order approach, Dybvig, Farnsworth and
Carpenter (2000) study the optimal contract in a broader game (i.e. in the class
of all contracts) with moral hazard concerns. Implementing a contract derived un-
der the rst order approach may be problematic. Our formulation gets around the
problem since we allow the manager to form the portfolio. This makes information
revelation trivial. The signal precision structure in our model is also dierent. An-
other dierence between our paper and theirs is that their optimal contract (when
implementable) might induce large punishments for the manager in some states. Such
large punishments may not be credible due to bankruptcy constraints. Our formula-
tion simplies the agency problem and allows us to explicitly deal with the sensitivity
of the manager's eort decision to changes in the manager's share in the portfolio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the basics of
the model. We distinguish four possible scenarios, depending on the restrictions on
portfolio choice (constrained/unconstrained) and the observability of eort (public-
information/moral hazard). The optimal linear unconstrained contract under public-
information is termed the rst best. The second best scenario is reserved for the
unconstrained, moral hazard contracts. The third best scenario refers to the con-
strained, moral hazard contracts. Section 2 studies linear contracts. Here we study
linear contracts without restrictions on portfolio choice, both in the rst best and sec-
ond best scenarios. The same analysis is repeated for constrained portfolio problems
in Section 3. Section 3.1 presents numerical results on the optimal linear contract
under limited leverage, the third best contract. Section 4 concludes the paper. Lin-
ear and quadratic contracts are compared in Appendix A. All proofs are provided in
Appendix B.
1 The model
A typical fund will inform the customer that managers (who are involved in invest-
ment research) are responsible for choosing each fund's investments. Customers may
also be informed about how the managers are compensated. Given the information,
the customer decides how much to invest in the fund. In this paper we shall abstract
from the decision problem of the consumer. Instead, assuming that the interests of
the customer and the fund owner are the same, we shall focus on the determination
of the manager's compensation scheme by the owner of the fund. Slightly abusing
terminology, we call the owner of the rm the investor.
Let the manager and the investor have preferences represented by exponential
utility functions. Throughout the paper we will use a > 0 (b > 0) to denote the
manager (investor) as well as her (his) absolute risk aversion coecient.
The manager's investment opportunity set consists of two assets: a risky asset
with net return ~ x and a riskless bond. Assume that ~ x is distributed as a standard
normal variable. The distribution of the risky asset return and the return on the
4bond are public information. As in Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), the bond is taken
as the benchmark portfolio against which the returns on the manager's portfolio are
measured.8
The investment horizon is one period. At the beginning of the period, the investor
transfers one unit of wealth to the manager who also receives a compensation contract
from the investor. This contract sets the management fee as a percentage of the wealth
under management and consists of two components: a xed at fee, denoted by F,
and a performance adjustment fee. The performance adjustment rate is calculated as
a percentage  of the portfolio's excess return over the net return of the benchmark
(which by assumption is the bond). Denote such a contract as (;F). Normalize the
net return of the bond to zero. If the manager refuses the contract the game ends
and she receives her reservation value (normalized to 1). If she accepts the contract,
she puts in some eort e which results in a signal y. The signal y is a realization of
random variable ~ y.9 After observing y, the manager forms a portfolio f(y);1(y)g
where (y) and 1(y) respectively denote the proportions invested by the manager
in the risky asset and the bond. Conditional on the contract (;F) and (y), the










The variable ~ y is partially correlated with the stock's return, ~ y = ~ x + ~  with ~ 
the noise term. The return on the risky asset and the noise term are assumed to
be uncorrelated. Let ~   N(0;2), with 2 < 1 such that higher 2 implies a less
precise signal.
Recall that the manager observes the signal after putting in her privately observed
eort. The amount of eort is assumed to aect the precision of the signal. More
concretely we assume that 2 = e1: Therefore, the signal's precision is an increasing
and concave function of eort, e
1+e: On the other hand, eort is costly for the manager.
With constant absolute risk aversion a, let V (a;e)=a be the monetary value of the
manager's disutility of eort e.
After receiving the signal the manager updates her beliefs about the distribution






.10 Given these updated beliefs,
the manager chooses (y): For any (;F) and , the conditional (net) wealth of the
manager and the investor can be written as, respectively:
~ Wa(y) = F +  ~ xjy; (1)
~ Wb(y) = (1  ) ~ xjy  F: (2)
The utilities of the investor and the portfolio manager are given by, respectively,
8The choice of the benchmark is a strategic decision that we do not address in this paper. See
Ou-Yang (1999) for a justication of the riskless asset as the optimal benchmark.
9We will follow the standard notation whereby a symbol with a tilde on top will represent the
variable and the same symbol, without a tilde, its realization.









= exp(b ~ Wb). We assume the
function V (a;e) is continuous and twice dierentiable, with continuous derivatives.
Moreover, the function is assumed to satisfy:11
Assumption (S1) V (a;0) = V 0(a;0) = 0
Assumption (S2) V 0(a;e) > 0for all e > 0
Assumption (S3)
V 00(a;e)e
V 0(a;e) > P(e) for all e > 0
Assumptions (S1) and (S2) are standard in the literature. Assumption (S3) sets
an upper bound to the signal's precision: the marginal cost of eort must increase fast
enough. This will guarantee the existence of an optimal eort level for the manager.
This assumption discards, for instance, linear disutility functions. Any quadratic
function of eort that satises (S1) and (S2) will verify (S3) as well.
2 Unconstrained linear contracts
Assume that the manager's eort decision is publicly observable. Given the negative
exponential utility functions for both the investor and the manager, the Pareto e-
cient sharing rules are linear -see Wilson (1968). Hence, each individual receives the
fraction of the risky asset equal to his risk tolerance divided by the aggregate social
risk tolerance. We will denote this result the rst best outcome, FB = 1
1+r, where
r = a
b represents the manager's \relative" (to the investor) risk aversion.
To derive the non-incentive result, assume that the signal is observed only by the
manager who decides, privately, how much eort to put in. Proceeding by backward
induction, we rst solve the manager's optimal portfolio problem. When the manager
is unconstrained in her portfolio choice, she can select any  from the real line <.
Given some eort choice e and some signal realization y, the manager chooses (y)












Having solved for the manager's optimal portfolio problem, we now need to solve
for her eort (previous stage) decision. Given (3), the manager forms her indi-







= exp(aF + V (a;e))  g(e); where









Notice that the manager's expected utility is independent of . The expected utility






Assumptions (S1)-(S3) guarantee the existence of eSB > 0 satisfying equation (5). The
second best eort choice is a function only of the manager's risk aversion coecient;
in particular, it does not depend on  or F. This, in essence, is the non-incentive
result.
Finally, in the rst stage, the investor oers the manager a contract (;F) that
maximizes her expected utility subject to the manager's incentive compatibility con-
straint, (5), and the manager's participation constraint. Since eSB is unique with
respect to (;F), we can write the investor's utility as a function of eSB and solve














We dene the functions m()  1
r and M()  m()(2  m()). These
functions will also help in later analysis. Let us denote (x) =
R x
0 (s)ds; with
(s) = 1 p
2 s1=2 exp(s=2) when s > 0; s = 0 otherwise. () is the cumulative
probability function of a Chi-square variable with one degree of freedom and () is
the corresponding density function.














Since the manager's expected utility (4) is independent of , the optimal contract
satises the rst order condition @
@M(SB) = 0: The function M() is concave for
all  < 3=2(1 + r), convex otherwise. Thus, given the later equation, it follows that
SB = 1
1+r is the (unique) solution to the investor's problem. The reader can verify
that this result corresponds to the rst best share of risk. In the second best, unre-
stricted scenario, the rst best split prevails in spite of the asymmetry in information.
Finally note that when b tends to zero SB tends to zero and hence the performance
adjustment fee (captured by ) has no role.
Replacing SB = FB in (6) and provided that the manager's participation con-
straint is binding in the optimum, the investor's expected utility in the unconstrained














Maximizing the later expression with respect to eort, we obtain the rst best
eort condition:
V




Comparing (5) with condition (8), it follows that the second best eort is always
smaller than the rst best eort.
3 Constrained linear contracts
We now study the eort and portfolio decisions of a manager who, unlike in the pre-
vious section, is restricted in her portfolio choice. We will distinguish between a con-
strained public-information scenario (where the manager's eort decision is publicly
observable) and a third best scenario, where the manager's eort decision is private.
In this scenario we will also analyze the eect of the restriction on the investor's
optimal linear contract problem.
The restriction, that we call \bounded short-selling" [BSS], can be expressed as
jj  , 1   < 1. The symmetry with respect to  is convenient in order to
simplify the algebra.13 Note that  can be any large number. All we require is that
it should not be innite.
Recall that  and 1   denote, respectively, the proportions invested by the
manager in the risky asset and the bond. Also, in our model, the bond is taken as
the benchmark portfolio. So, given the contract (;F), the [BSS] restriction can be
interpreted as a constraint on the manager's \personal" portfolio, f;(1  )g, as
well as a constraint on the portfolio leverage. For instance, if  = 1, [BSS] implies
that the maximum short-selling allowed is 100% of the initial wealth (  1).
Symmetrically, it also implies that 1  2. Hence, the maximum amount of money
the manager is allowed to hold in the benchmark is 2 (in our model, the initial
wealth is normalized to 1 unit).
We start by providing an intuitive answer to the following question: How does
our restriction inuence the manager's eort decision? Increasing eort expenditure
implies that the signal's precision becomes sharper. However, introducing [BSS] \dis-
torts" the manager's portfolio decision: for certain signals, the manager may not be
able to form the portfolio of her choice. From an ex-ante perspective, the net eect
of this trade-o results in a decrease in the marginal utility of eort as compared to
13Note that ~ y has a normal distribution. None of our results depends, qualitatively, on this
assumption.
8the case where [BSS] does not hold. As a consequence,  now plays an additional
role: by increasing  the investor can \marginally" relax the restriction imposed by
[BSS]. Hence, a higher  induces the manager to exert higher eort.
Based on the above intuition, it follows that the manager's optimal eort under
[BSS] will be: (i) smaller than eSB for all  and (ii) increasing in . Also, the
distortion between the two eort levels should be inversely related to the manager's
risk aversion: i.e. the larger is a the smaller is the eect of [BSS] on the manager's
eort decision. In the limit, when either  or a tend to innity, the eect of the
restriction should vanish and we should return to the second best. In what follows,
we formalize this intuition.
As in Section 1, we proceed by backward induction. The manager's optimal






subject to     . Let l  0 (lower bound) and u  0 (upper bound) denote
the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers, such that, at the optimal (+)l = 0 and
(  )u = 0.
Conditional on the signal realization y, and a given level of eort e, there are three






> 0, then short-selling is







leverage is at the maximum and (y) = . Otherwise, l = u = 0, and the optimal
portfolio is (y) = e
ay.
The later, \interior" solution coincides with the manager's optimal portfolio (3)
in the unconstrained problem. The dollar amount, , invested in the risky asset
by the manager in her \personal" portfolio is independent of . In the \corner"
solutions the dollar amount invested () or sold short () in the risky asset is,
in absolute value, increasing in : the manager will \behave" indeed as an investor
with decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Writing the optimal portfolio as a function of the signal y, we have:
(y) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
 if y < a
e
e
ay if jyj a
e
 if y >a
e :
(9)
We are now in a position to solve for the manager' choice of eort. Let us rst
investigate the manager's utility of eort. Recall that the manager had accepted some
contract (;F) in the beginning of the game. To decide on how much eort to put in
she uses the knowledge that for each y that she observes in the future, she will form
the portfolio (y). Replacing the optimal portfolio (y) in the manager's conditional
expected utility function and taking expectations over y we arrive at the manager's
unconditional expected utility function.
Proposition 1 Given the contract (;F) and the constraint  < 1, the expected































a decreasing and convex function of eort e:
Equation (10) conrms the intuition presented at the beginning of this section.
The unconditional expected utility of the constrained manager (i.e. after introducing
[BSS]) can be expressed as the weighted sum of two utility functions.14 The rst
function corresponds to the \interior" expected utility in (4) where the manager is
not aected by the constraint. The second function is the manager's expected utility
when the constraint is binding. In that case the manager sets jj = . Note that,
unlike the unconstrained case, g(ej) depends on . So, an interesting question is:
how will changes in  aect the manager's utility? Corollary 1 answers this question.
Corollary 1 Given some contract (;F) and the constraint  < 1, the manager's
unconditional expected utility is increasing in : In the limit, when either the con-
straint, ; or the manager's risk aversion coecient, a; tend to innity, the marginal
utility of  is zero.
Note that the second part of the corollary derives the no-incentive result as a
special case of our model. To see the intuition behind the corollary, let us rewrite the
constraint [BSS], given (3), as follows:
jyje  a: (11)
The left-hand term represents the risky asset's conditional mean return (absolute
value) weighted by its precision. The right-hand side term is the short-selling limit,
, multiplied by the manager's risk aversion coecient weighed by . Clearly, as long
as jyj < a=e, the manager's optimal decision will not be aected by [BSS]. In this
case, the marginal utility of  is zero and the manager's eort decision is independent
of the contract. However, when the signal exceeds either bound (i.e. for \very good"
or \very bad" signals) the manager would want to invest in her portfolio more than
she is allowed to. Clearly, such a distorting eect will diminish as  and/or the risk
aversion a increase. So, for all a < 1, the manager's marginal utility of  is positive.
14The disutility function, V (a;e), aects both terms. This is because the eort decision is taken
ex-ante, before the signal is observed. Note that the weights are not constant: they are a function
of eort themselves.
10In the limit, when the right-hand side term in (11) tends to innity the restriction
vanishes and (10) converges towards the unconstrained utility function (4).
We now consider the manager's choice of eort. The manager chooses eort to




exp(aF + V (a;e))  g(ej): (12)
We are interested in the properties of the third best eort. Note that, unlike in the
unconstrained second best case, eort now depends on . Corollary 1 had shown that
the utility of the constrained manager increases in : by increasing the performance
adjustment fee in the contract, the investor allows the manager to get \marginally"
closer to her optimal unconstrained personal portfolio. The investor can now exploit
this phenomenon to inuence the manager's eort choice. In fact, eort turns out to
be an increasing function of .
The intuition works as follows. Recall that the manager decides how much eort
to exert after accepting the contract (;F) and before receiving the signal. When the
manager is unconstrained then, for any signal y, the absolute value of the manager's
unconstrained portfolio (3) is increasing in eort. This marginal benet is traded
o against the inherent marginal disutility of eort to get at the second best level
of eort. However, when the manager is constrained, equation (11) tells us that by
exerting more eort the manager could actually \enhance" the distortion induced by
[BSS]. Therefore, the marginal utility of eort and (hence) eort is lower than in the
second best case.
Proposition 2 Given assumptions (S1)-(S3), the contract (;F) and the constraint
 < 1; there exists a unique eTB()  0 that maximizes the manager's expected
utility. Moreover, eSB > eTB() for all  2 [0;1]. Both are equal, in the limit, when
either the constraint, , or the manager's risk aversion coecient, a, tend to innity.
Now, following up with the argument in (11), a contract with a higher  marginally
enlarges the manager's personal portfolio opportunity set: certain portfolios that were
not feasible before turn now to be feasible. As a consequence, the marginal utility
of eort increases. Thus, the optimal eort put by the manager is higher. In other
words, the third best eort moves towards the second best.
Corollary 2 The manager's eort eTB() is a continuous and dierentiable function.
Moreover, it is increasing in :
We now turn now to the investor's (rst stage) problem. First, we introduce the in-
vestor's unconditional utility function when the manager faces [BSS]. The constrained
manager solves the restricted problem in Section 3 and her optimal portfolio is (9).







11as a function of m() and M() dened in Section 2. Following the same procedure
we used to derive the manager's unconditional expected utility function, we arrive at
the investors's expected utility function. It is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under [BSS], for a given contract (;F); the expected utility function



































After deriving the close-from solution to the investor's expected utility, we want
to investigate how the presence of portfolio constraints and moral hazard aects
the optimal linear contract. Assume rst that the manager's eort decision were
observable. In this case the investor maximizes his expected utility with respect to 
and eort subject to the participation constraint exp(aF + V (a;e))  g(ej) 
1: Clearly, eort is not a function of F. This, along with the facts that the left-
hand side is increasing in F and the investor's utility is decreasing in F, implies that
under the optimal contract the participation constraint is binding. So, the investor's







= exp(V (a;e)=r)  g(ej)
1=r  f(;e): (14)
On the other hand, when the manager's eort decision is not observable by the
investor, the third best problem consists in nding the optimal split TB that maxi-
mizes (14) subject to the manager's optimal eort condition (12). Note that, due to
rst order condition (B7) in the Appendix B, (12) is uniquely solvable in terms of .
Despite this simplication, it is dicult to nd a closed form solution for the
optimal linear contract. Yet, we can still show that under [BSS] and in the absence
of moral hazard, the rst best risk-share is still optimal, consistently with the result
in Haugen and Taylor (1987). On the contrary, in the presence of moral hazard, the
optimal TB is no longer equal to FB. This is to be expected because under [BSS]
 plays an additional role over risk-sharing. As in most moral hazard problems,
eciency in risk allocation has to be traded o against eort inducement. These
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the eort decision is public information, the rst best risk
share, FB, is optimal under [BSS]. Moreover, for any nite , the investor's optimal
eort choice is smaller than the rst best eort. When  ! 1 both levels of eort
coincide.
When the eort decision is not observable by the investor, the rst best risk share,
FB, is not optimal under [BSS].
123.1 A numerical solution to the linear third best contract
As mentioned in the previous section, it is dicult to solve analytically for the optimal
contract. In this section we present a numerical solution for the third best contract.
Our interest will pertain to the optimal third best share, TB. We assume a quadratic
disutility function of eort, V (a;e) = ae2. Exercises will be carried out by setting
the investor's risk-tolerance coecient (1=b) to 24. We will consider four dierent
values for the manager's risk-tolerance coecient 1=a = f3;8;15;24g. We will vary
the short-selling/leverage constraint, , through 10 integer values, from 1 (tightest
restriction, no leverage) through 10 (weakest restriction).
Given the disutility function, condition (5) implies that the second best eort of
a manager with risk-tolerance coecient 1=a is eSB(1=a) = 1
2
p
1 + 1=a  1

. Thus,
for the four dierent values of the risk tolerance coecient under study we obtain the
corresponding values of eSB(1=a) = f1=2;1;3=2;2g. Note that the second best eort
increases with the manager's risk tolerance.15
For each , the algorithm creates a grid of 99 values of  from 0:01 through
0:99. Condition (B7) in the Appendix B is solved for each pair (;). That gives a
numerical value of eTB for each pair (;). The resulting matrices of third best eorts
(which we do not report) conrm the predictions of Proposition 2 and Corollary 2:
for all risk-aversion coecients and all leverage bounds, the third best eort is (i)
smaller than the corresponding second best eort and (ii) increasing in . Figure 1
plots eTB as a function of  for four values of  when 1=a = 1=b = 8.
For each , the investor's expected utility (14) is evaluated across . Note that eTB
and FTB as functions of  are implicitly taken into account in these calculations (the
latter is a function of  due to the fact that the participation constraint is binding).
Figure 3 plots the investor's expected utility function as a function of  for four values
of  when 1=a = 1=b = 8. In all cases, the investor's expected utility as a function of
 is concave. In such a case, the proof of Proposition 4 implies that TB > FB.
The rst row within each panel in Table 1 reports the values of TB(1=a;1=b)
which maximize the investor's expected utility for 1=b = 24, 1=a = f3;8;15;24g
and  = 1;:::;10. In all cases, the gures illustrate an important numerical result:
TB > FB in the constrained scenario. This, as mentioned earlier is a consequence
of the concavity of the investor's utility function. Interestingly, as  increases (i.e.,
the constraint is relaxed) TB monotonically converges to FB.
The relationship between the manager's risk-aversion and = =
TBFB
FB ; for
dierent s; is reported in the second row of each panel in Table 1. We see that,
for each , the dierence in percentage is higher for higher values of the manager's
15The region of \acceptable" relative risk aversion coecients varies from source to source -see
Mehra and Prescott (1985). Our manager's expected relative risk aversion coecient is dened as
her absolute risk aversion coecient a times the manager's unconditional expected portfolio wealth,
Ey(~ x(y)) = e
a: Thus, the values of a are chosen so as to yield eSB(1=a) 2 [1=2;2]:
13risk-aversion. The dierence can be very dramatic: it ranges from over 280% for
(1=a = 3; = 1) to 20% for (1=a = 24; = 10).
These results suggest that benchmarked contracts may play a signicant role in
providing incentives to managers for exerting eort. When the short-selling bounds
decrease (making the restriction tighter) the volatility of the portfolio decreases as
well since fewer extreme portfolios are feasible. If the investor does not increase the
performance adjustment fee the manager will be under-exposed to active management
risk. As a consequence, eort will also decrease. The risk sharing and the eort
inducement arguments are aligned in the same direction: the optimal performance
adjustment fee increases. The change in  due to the incentive role is more visible the
smaller the manager's risk tolerance because FB in that case is relatively smaller.
The third and fourth rows of each panel in Table 1 report the percentage dier-
ence in eort, e=e =
eTB(TB)eTB(FB)
eTB(FB) , and certainty equivalent wealth, C=C =
CTB(TB)CTB(FB)
CTB(FB) , in the constrained scenario.16 Hence, the ratio C=C, can be
interpreted as the net return (on the end-of-period wealth CTB(FB)) that would
compensate the investor for the lower utility of the suboptimal split, FB, in the
third best scenario.
The last column in Table 1 represents very relaxed constraints ( = 10). Even
here, e=e is around 30% for the most risk averse manager. In all cases e=e decreases
with the manager's risk tolerance. An analogous result follows when we study the
dierence in eort across .
With respect to the percentage change in the certainty equivalent wealth, we
see that the potential \eciency" loss that arises from compensating the manager
through the suboptimal FB is almost negligible when the manager is suciently
risk-tolerant (1=a = 24). However, in the standard situation where the manager is
assumed to be more risk-averse than the investor this loss can rise up to 9%, even
when  = 10. Moreover, as  gets tighter, this dierence gets substantially enhanced.
Also note that in the reverse direction, when the constraint vanishes the third best
scenario converges into the unconstrained second best scenario.
4 Conclusions
Our paper deals with a normative rather than a positive issue. We do not attempt
to explain the dierent forms of managerial compensation that exist in the nancial
system. However, our paper provides a starting point for such analysis. In particular,
our second and third results suggest a simple yet important fact. If moral hazard
on the part of fund managers is an important consideration and this manager is
leverage constrained then simple performance based incentives (as allowed by SEC
16CTB() denotes the amount of end-of-period wealth that gives the constrained investor the same
utility as (14).
14regulations) should alleviate moral hazard problems. If moral hazard is not much
of a problem then performance based incentives are not necessary. This explanation
seems simple and intuitive in light of agency theory. Yet, to reach such conclusions we
need to take recourse to leverage constraints. Once we recognize the context where
performance based incentives may be useful, we can move on to more specic and
detailed analysis on the exact nature of such incentives. Though we leave this task
to future research, below we provide a brief discussion of managerial compensation
in dierent fund industries.
Linear performance-based contracts are quite prevalent in the hedge funds indus-
try. Hedge fund industry managers typically receive a proportion of the fund return
each year in excess of the portfolio's previous \high watermark." Note that present
returns are independent of this watermark and, hence, this index is similar to bond
returns (normalized to zero) in our model. If one were to consider life-time earnings,
then for patient managers, contracts in the hedge fund industry would look linear
and similar to the contracts considered in this paper.
As for the mutual fund industry, the lack of explicit performance-based incen-
tives, inspite of the SEC Act, has prompted an ongoing debate among researchers
and practitioners questioning the symmetry stipulated in the Act. The debate fo-
cuses on fund performance and risk-taking incentives provided by symmetric versus
asymmetric contracts (see for example, Starks (1987), Cohen and Starks (1988), Golec
(1988), Grinblatt and Titman (1989)). More recently, Das and Sundaram (1998, 1999)
and Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) have focused on the equilibrium volatility and portfolio
turnover of both types of contracts. In particular, Das and Sundaram (1998) suggest
that if the Act were to allow for asymmetric contracts then one could perhaps see
more performance based contracts in the industry.
In this paper, we have argued that linear (and symmetric) performance-adjusted
contracts do provide managers with incentives for gathering better information when
the manager is constrained in her ability to short-sell. Our numerical results suggest
that under short selling constraints the investor would be substantially worse o if
he were to set performance adjustment fees only to share risk. By enhancing this
component of compensation he can induce the manager to gather better information
and as a result be better o. Our numerical results also show that such incentive
schemes provide strong incentives when restrictions on short-selling is tight. Since
mutual funds impose tighter restrictions on short-selling (compared to hedge funds)
we should, ceteris paribus, see a larger prevalence of linear contracts in the mutual
funds industry. In light of the discussion in the previous paragraph, our results seem
to add to the paradox. Of course, whether, or not, our results are paradoxical is an
empirical issue. Nevertheless, we provide some reasons as to why we think our results
may not be paradoxical.
First, moral hazard may not be perceived to be of much importance in the mutual
fund industry, at least relative to the hedge fund industry (Goetzmann, Ingersoll and
Ross (1998)). On the other hand, our results suggest that leverage constraints in
15the hedge fund industry may be (implicitly) tighter than usually accepted, thereby
explaining the higher incentive fees among hedge fund managers.17
Second, if consumers were to shift assets between funds based on performance,
then compensation through \at" fees (asset-based fees) would indirectly act as per-
formance based fees. In other words, such contract could provide indirect incentives
via fund ows over time. For example, Sirri and Tufano (1992), Brown, Harlow and
Starks (1996), Gruber (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) have documented a
convex relationship between the net investment ow into mutual funds and the fund's
performance relative to its peers. From a temporal point of view, at fees could then
act as a non-linear performance based contract and such contracts could simply out-
perform our (or the SEC's) linear contracts. The degree of non-linearity is, however,
not very clear. Especially, in light of our next observation.
Third, of late some mutual funds have started oering performance based contracts
to their managers. For example, at Fidelity Funds, the at fee (F) for Small Cap
Stock, Mid-Cap Stock and Large Cap Stock funds for the scal year ended April 30,
2000, was 0:73%, 0:58% and 0:58%, respectively, of the funds's average net assets.
The respective performance adjustment fees is calculated comparing the performance
of the corresponding fund to the performance of the Russell 2000, S&P MidCap 400
and S&P 500. The maximum performance adjustment rate is 0:20% of the fund's
average net assets. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, Elton, Gruber and
Blake (2001) document that though less than 2% of US mutual funds use (fulcrum)
incentive fees, they account for 10.5% of the total assets under management. The
rate of growth for these funds is also higher than that for the industry in general.
Though, on average, these funds do not earn positive incentive fees, their risk-adjusted
performance is higher than that for other funds, suggesting a tendency to induce more
eort from managers in place. Whether, or not, the mutual funds industry as a whole
follows in the direction of these leaders is something to be observed over time.
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Appendix A: Quadratic contracts
In this section, we study the quadratic contracts proposed by Bhattacharya and Peiderer (1985).
This type of contracts are interesting because they are known to elicit truthful information about
the signal observed by the portfolio manager. Hence, the portfolio can be formed by the investor.
Assume the investor oers the manager a quadratic contract (;F). Given the contract, the
manager puts in eort and reports the signal to the investor. The investor incorporates this infor-
mation (~ xjy) and decides the optimal portfolio (y). Hence, the conditional payos for the investor
and the manager are, respectively:18
~ W q




b (y) =  (~ xjy  M)
2  F + ~ xjy;
where M(y) = e
1+ey is the reported conditional mean of the risky asset, ~ xjy.
According to Bhattacharya and Peiderer (1985), the manager's expected utility under the















In deriving this result, Assumption (S4):  < 1+e
2a ; is necessary to guarantee the convergence
of the expected utility integrals.19 This assumption will play an important role when we compare
18We will use the superscript q to distinguish between linear and quadratic contracts.
19The authors claim (Section 4, page 15) that \the distribution of wealth obtained by the agent
when this inequality is violated is dominated by every distribution which can be obtained when the
inequality is observed."
18linear and quadratic contracts.
From the appendix in Stoughton (1993) we obtain the investor's conditional expected utility as























In the public-information case, the investor maximizes (A2) with respect to  2 < and then
averages across the signal y. The result is the investor's ex ante unconstrained expected utility20 as
a function of  and e.









ject to     : Like in the linear case, let l  0 (lower bound) and u  0 (upper bound)
denote the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers, such that, at the optimal (q + )l = 0 and
(q  )u = 0:





: Notice that, given assumption (S4), Q() >
















> 0, the leverage is at the maximum and q(y) = . Otherwise, l = u = 0,
and the optimal portfolio is q(y) = e
aQ()y.
Writing the optimal portfolio as a function of the signal y, we have:
q(y) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :




aQ()y if jyj 
aQ()
e




The reader can verify that the optimal constrained portfolio for linear contract, (9), and the
quadratic contract, (A3), coincide for  = Q().
Plugging the portfolio choice (A3) in (A2) we obtain the following conditional expected utility
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We are now in a position to derive the investor's unconditional expected utility as a function
of the contract (;F) and eort. The result is presented in the following proposition whose proof
follows trivially given (A4) and the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix B.
20Stoughton (1993), Proposition 2, equation (25).
19Proposition 5 Under [BSS], for a given quadratic contract (;F), the expected utility function of





















Provided that the participation constraint is binding, the investor's expected utility becomes a



























At this point, we can compare linear and quadratic contracts when the manager's eort decision
is observed by the investor, both under [BSS] and in the unconstrained case.
Proposition 6 Assume that the manager's eort decision is observable by the investor. Then,
given (S4), the risk averse investor prefers the linear over the quadratic, both under [BSS] and in
the unconstrained case.
We are unable to analytically compare linear and quadratic contracts under moral hazard. So
we resort to numerical methods. We assume that quadratic contacts induce truthful revelation even
under [BSS]. Thus, in what follows, the investor's utility under quadratic contracts should be thought
of as an upper bound. Furthermore, investor's utility under linear contracts are derived under the
model where the manager (instead of the investor) forms the portfolio. The results would remain the
same if we were to allow the investor to form the portfolio, and the investor commits to the schedule
(y;e) which the manager forms in our model. This trivially induces truthful reporting of (y;e).
However, it may not be the optimal mechanism to induce truthful reporting under linear contracts.
Thus, the reported investor's utility under linear contracts should be thought of as a lower bound.
To recapitulate, in what follows, we compare the highest possible investor's utility under quadratic
contracts to the lowest possible investor's utility under linear contracts.
In the presence of moral hazard, the manager maximizes her expected utility (A1) with respect
to eort given the contract (;F). This yields the following rst-order condition for the quadratic



















Notice that, for the quadratic contract, the manager's eort decision in increasing in . Hence,
the non-incentive result from linear contracts can be overcome by oering the manager a quadratic
contract.
The investor will maximizes his expected utility (A5) subject to the manager's optimal eort
decision (A6). Like in the linear case, we cannot solve analytically for the quadratic third best
contract. We follow a numerical procedure similar to the analysis we used in Section 3.1.
We assume the same eort disutility function, V (a;e) = ae2. Replacing this function in (A6)
we obtain the following condition:
20(a;e) =
2e(1 + e)2
4ae(1 + e) + 1
: (A7)
The reader can easily verify that (a;e) < 1+e
2a hence satisfying assumption (S4). Notice that
(a;e) is decreasing in a.
We replace the later expression in (A5) and solve for the optimal third best eort as a function
of the manager's risk aversion coecient (1=a 2 f3;8;15;24g) and  = 1;2;:::;10. The investor's
risk tolerance is assumed to be 1=b = 24. Plugging these values back into (A7) we obtain the third
best values of . Like in the linear case, the plots (not shown here) of the expected utility as a
function of  are always concave. The quadratic second and third best optimal eort expenditure,
s and expected utility are reported in Table 2. We also report, for comparison, the corresponding
linear values for eort and expected utility.
For all values of the manager's risk tolerance except the highest (1=a = 1=b = 24), the second
best quadratic eort is higher than the linear eort. Inspite of this, the investor derives higher utility
from linear contracts (except for 1=a = 3 and  > 4). This is because it is \cheaper" to induce eort
through linear contracts. Moreover, and in general, when the short selling constraint gets tighter (
decreases) both levels of eort converge.
Like in Stoughton (1993), when the gap in risk tolerance coecients between agent and principal
is large enough (in our case, for 1=a = 3), unconstrained, second best quadratic contracts dominate
linear contracts. Interestingly, when the manager's constraint becomes tighter (concretely for  < 5)
the result reverses: linear contracts dominate quadratic contracts.
To gain more intuition about this result, Figure 2 shows, for four dierent values of  2
f1;10;100;1000g, the investor's percentage loss in certainty equivalent wealth (relative to the rst
best certainty equivalent wealth), as a function of his risk tolerance coecient, when the man-
ager is compensated with a quadratic contract. This is a measure of the eciency loss induced by
moral hazard relative to the public-information scenario. The lower right corner graph ( = 1000)
corresponds, in the limit, to the (unconstrained) second best convergence result (Figure 2, page
2022) reported in Stoughton (1993): the agency cost under quadratic contract drops o rapidly as
a function of the principal's risk tolerance. However, when  is nite, increasing the manager's risk
tolerance produces quite the opposite result: after an initial reduction (the more limited the lower
 is), the eciency loss from using quadratic contracts increases with the investor's risk tolerance.
Appendix B: Proofs
The investor's unconditional expected utility. Given her utility function and the denition of
her conditional wealth in (2), the investor's (conditional) expected utility function can be written
























































Substituting s = y2e
1+eM()
1+e in the later equation and given the denition of () we arrive at
equation (6).







exp(aF + V (a;e)) 
8
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if y > a
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; the manager's unconditional expected util-
ity. We propose the following change of variable: s = e
(1+e)(y  a)2 if y < a
e ; s = e(1 +
e)y2 if jyj  a
e and s = e
(1+e)(y + a)2 if y > a
e . Replacing the new variable in the manager's
unconditional expected utility and given the denition of () we arrive at (10).













































Proof of Corollary 1. First, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For all 0 < x < 1, (x)  1
2 (1  (x)) > 0:
Proof: For all x > 0, 1
2 (1  (x)) = 1 p





2 exp(s=2)s3=2 ds: There-
fore, (x)  1





2 exp(s=2)s3=2 ds > 0:
Given the manager's expected utility in Proposition 1 the rst part of the corollary will be

























< 0; for all  2 (0;1].
To prove the second part, we show that lima!1 g(ej) = g(e). By denition, limx!1 (x) =

















exp(x=2) : Both functions (exponential and ()) are continuous
and dierentiable. Taking the derivative of the numerator and the denominator with respect to x,
the limit in (B4) is equal to limx!1
exp(x=e)
x = 0:
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we prove the existence and uniqueness of eTB. Let us call J(ej
) = V 0(a;e)  g(e j) + g0
(e j ); the rst derivative of the manager's expected utility function
with respect to e. The third best eort satises:
J(eTB j ) = 0; (B5)
J 0
(eTB j ) > 0: (B6)
Condition (B5) can be written like follows:





For  = 0, eTB(0) = 0. Let us prove that the right-hand side term is monotonous decreasing in
e for all  2 (0;1]. Taking the derivative of this term with respect to e and given (10) and equations
(B2) and (B3) we get g00
(e j )  g(e j )  (g0

















g(ej) is (monotonous) decreasing in e for all  2 (0;1] with domain (0;1=2]. By assumption,
V 0(a;e) > 0 for all e > 0. Hence, for any  2 (0;1] there exists a unique eTB() > 0 that solves
condition (B5).


















g(ej)  0 for all  2 [0;1], then assumption (S3) implies (B6).
We prove next that eSB > eTB() for all  2 [0;1]. The case of  = 0 is trivial since
eTB(0) = 0 < eSB. For  > 0, let us re-write the function J(ej) as J(ej) =
h






















e (1 + e)

: Evaluating this function






















J(eSB j) < 0: Therefore, for the constrained manager, the marginal utility of eort at eSB is neg-
ative. Since eTB is unique and the function is continuous in e, given conditions (B5) and (B6), it
follows that eSB > eTB.
Finally, given equation (B4), J(eSB j) tends to zero when a tend to innity.
Proof of Corollary 2. We know that eTB(0) = 0. According to (B5), for any ^  2 (0;1], there
exists eTB(^ ) > 0 such that J(eTB j ^ ) = 0: The function J is continuous and dierentiable with
respect to (;e). Given (B6), the implicit function theorem allows us to solve \locally" the equation;
that is, to express e as a function of  in a neighborhood of (^ ;eTB).
More formally: given ^  2 (0;1] there exists a function e(),continuous and dierentiable, and an
open ball B(^ ), such that e(^ ) = eTB and J(e()j) = 0 for all  2 B(^ ). Taking the derivative
of the last equation with respect to  and evaluated at ^ , @
@e(^ ) =  @
@J(eTB j ^ )J 01
 (eTB j ^ ):
From (B6), J 0
(eTB j ^ ) > 0. Therefore, the proposition will be proved if we show @
@J(eTB j ^ ) =
V 0(a;eTB)  @
@g(eTBj ^ ) + @
@g0
(eTBj ^ ) < 0; for all ^  2 (0;1]. From (S2), V 0(a;eTB) > 0 . From
Corollary 1, @
@g(eTBj ^ ) < 0. Finally, given equation (B3), @
@g0
(eTBj ^ ) < 0. Since the proof
holds for any ^  2 (0;1], the Corollary is proved.
23Proof of Proposition 3. Given the investor's indirect utility function in Section 3 the investor's


































































We propose the following change of variable: s = e
(1+e)(y  am())2 if y < a
e ; s =
y2e
1+eM()
1+e if jyj  a
e and s = e
(1+e)(y + am())2 if y > a
e : Replacing the new variable in
the investor's unconditional expected utility we obtain (13).
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we prove the results under the assumption of public information.
The following Lemma shows that the rst best split is (rst-order) optimal in the absence of moral
hazard:


















= exp(V (a;e)=r)  g(eja)1=r

1
r g(ej)1  @
@ g(ej)  f(;e) + @
@ f(;e)




























































: Taking now the derivative of f(;e) with respect
to , @

































Replacing the two later expressions in (B8) the lemma is proved.
Evaluating (14) at FB yields the investor's expected utility function in the constrained public-







= exp(V (a;e)=r)  g(ejFB)(1+r)=r: (B9)
Finally, taking the derivative of (B9) with respect to eort and making it equal to zero we





g(eCPI jFB): It is easy to show that when  ! 1 the later condition converges to condition
(8) for the rst best eort. Clearly, for any nite , eCPI < eFB.
24We now prove the result under moral hazard. According to (B5), given the second best SB =
1
1+r > 0, there exists a unique eTB(SB) > 0 such that J(eTB jSB) = 0: Since the participation con-











0; where e() is, according to Corollary 2, a continuous and dierentiable function, increasing in 
with e(SB) = eTB.





































= exp(V (a;e)=r)  g(ejSB)(1+r)=r: Taking the













exp(V (a;eTB)=r)  g(eTB jSB)1=r  [J(eTB jSB) + rg0
(eTB jSB)]:
By denition, J(eTB jSB) = 0. From (B2), g0
(eTB jSB) < 0. Therefore, given Lemma 2, the














Therefore, SB is suboptimal in the third best scenario.
Proof of Proposition 6. The measure used to compare both contracts is the investor's certainty
equivalent wealth. Given the investor's utility function, Ub( ~ Wb) = exp(b ~ Wb), the certainty
equivalent wealth of the expected utility u is given by the inverse of this function, C(u) = ln(u)=b.
Clearly, for any two values of the investor's expected utility, u1 and u2, u1 > u2 if and only if
C(u1) > C(u2).
Given Lemma 2, FB is optimal in the linear, constrained public-information case. Hence, the
investor's expected utility is given by equation (B9) and the constrained, linear certainty equivalent
wealth (net of disutility of eort) turns out to be C(e;FB) = a+b
ab (-lngk(ejFB)):
In the case of quadratic contracts, given (A5), the constrained, quadratic certainty equivalent
















aQ() : Taking the




From Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 we know that gk(ej) is decreasing in  and e and bounded
below one. Moreover, given equation (B2) in the Appendix B, @
@ g0
(ej) < 0. Since, by denition,
Q() > FB then jgk(ejQ())j < jgk(ejFB)j for any e and . Therefore, given the denition of










; for any ,  and e. It is
now straightforward to see that the right-hand term in the later expression is strictly positive if and
only if assumption (S4) holds.
Notice that the later proof holds for any . It is trivial to prove that the same result follows in
the unconstrained scenario when  ! 1.
25Table 1: Optimal third best values of  and comparative statics with the
rst best for 1=b = 24.
= and e=e represent, respectively, the (percentage) change in the investor's optimal contract
and the manager's eort expenditure when the later is oered the (sub-optimal) rst best split FB
in the constrained, third best scenario. C=C, can be interpreted as the net return that would
compensate the investor for the lower utility of the suboptimal share FB in the third best scenario.
The manager's disutility function of eort is assumed to be V (a;e) = ae2. First best values FB are
reported in parenthesis.
Value of the short-selling constraint 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 3 (FB = 0:11)
TB 0.43 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19
= 287 215 179 152 125 116 98.0 89.0 80.0 70.9
e=e 128 96.9 80.4 68.1 56.3 51.3 43.3 38.8 34.4 30.2
C=C 29.0 22.8 19.3 16.8 14.9 13.4 12.1 11.0 10.0 09.1
Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 8 (FB = 0:25)
TB 0.61 0.53 0.48 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.38
= 144 112 92.0 84.0 72.0 68.0 60.0 56.0 52.0 52.0
e=e 69.8 54.0 44.5 40.3 34.7 32.5 28.7 26.7 24.7 24.4
C=C 13.1 10.1 08.5 07.5 06.7 06.2 05.7 05.3 05.0 04.7
Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 15 (FB = 0:38)
TB 0.72 0.65 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.50
= 87.2 69.0 56.0 50.8 45.6 40.4 37.8 35.2 32.6 30.0
e=e 44.0 34.2 27.7 24.9 22.3 19.8 18.5 17.2 15.9 14.6
C=C 06.7 05.0 04.1 03.5 03.1 02.8 02.6 02.4 02.3 02.1
Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 24 (FB = 0:50)
TB 0.79 0.73 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60
= 58.0 46.0 38.0 36.0 30.0 26.0 24.0 22.0 22.0 20.0
e=e 30.0 23.22 18.9 17.7 14.8 12.8 11.8 10.8 10.7 09.8
C=C 03.7 02.7 02.2 01.8 01.6 01.4 01.3 01.2 01.1 01.0
26Table 2: Optimal values of , eort expenditure and expected utility for
1=b = 24: The manager's disutility function of eort is assumed to be V (a;e) = ae2.
The superscripts Q and L denote quadratic and linear case, respectively. The second
best values (SB) are reported in the last row.
Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 3 Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 8
 TB eQ
TB eL
TB EUtilityQ EUtilityL TB eQ
TB eL
TB EUtilityQ EUtilityL
1 0.34 0.16 0.16 -0.991087 -0.990022 0.48 0.19 0.20 -0.990211 -0.989047
2 0.55 0.25 0.22 -0.979621 -0.978200 0.77 0.28 0.28 -0.977943 -0.975501
3 0.71 0.32 0.26 -0.967645 -0.966392 1.03 0.35 0.33 -0.965316 -0.961540
4 0.85 0.38 0.28 -0.955652 -0.954970 1.26 0.41 0.38 -0.9528 -0.947647
5 0.98 0.44 0.30 -0.943858 -0.944080 1.46 0.46 0.41 -0.940589 -0.934030
6 1.10 0.49 0.32 -0.932377 -0.933765 1.67 0.51 0.45 -0.928777 -0.920793
7 1.21 0.54 0.33 -0.92127 -0.924058 1.85 0.55 0.48 -0.917407 -0.907998
8 1.32 0.59 0.35 -0.91057 -0.914938 2.03 0.59 0.50 -0.906501 -0.895667
9 1.41 0.63 0.36 -0.900294 -0.906402 2.21 0.63 0.53 -0.89606 -0.883818
10 1.52 0.68 0.37 -0.890446 -0.898428 2.39 0.67 0.56 -0.886083 -0.872449
SB 3.59 1.76 0.50 -0.713478 -0.804401 7.29 1.65 1.00 -0.704506 -0.656763
Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 15 Manager's risk tolerance 1=a = 24
 TB eQ
TB eL
TB EUtilityQ EUtilityL TB eQ
TB eL
TB EUtilityQ EUtilityL
1 0.57 0.21 0.22 -0.98981 -0.988605 0.62 0.22 0.23 -0.989596 -0.988357
2 0.91 0.30 0.31 -0.977114 -0.974225 0.99 0.31 0.33 -0.976654 -0.973472
3 1.22 0.37 0.37 -0.964085 -0.959209 1.33 0.38 0.40 -0.963387 -0.957794
4 1.51 0.43 0.43 -0.951195 -0.944096 1.65 0.44 0.46 -0.950262 -0.941906
5 1.76 0.48 0.47 -0.938635 -0.929127 2.00 0.50 0.51 -0.937472 -0.926050
6 2.04 0.53 0.51 -0.926493 -0.914429 2.24 0.54 0.55 -0.925109 -0.910391
7 2.26 0.57 0.55 -0.914813 -0.900075 2.57 0.59 0.59 -0.913206 -0.895004
8 2.50 0.61 0.58 -0.90361 -0.886108 2.85 0.63 0.63 -0.901786 -0.879943
9 2.75 0.65 0.61 -0.892884 -0.872550 3.14 0.67 0.67 -0.890849 -0.865238
10 3.00 0.69 0.64 -0.882634 -0.859416 3.37 0.70 0.70 -0.880389 -0.850908
SB 10.78 1.66 1.50 -0.689056 -0.521662 14.01 1.698 2.00 -0.675152 -0.393787
27Figure 1: Manager’s eﬀort as a function of α for diﬀerent values of κ =
{1(steepest),4,7,10(ﬂatest)}. The manager risk tolerance coeﬃcient is 1/a =8 .
The horizontal line represents the second best eﬀort eSB =1 , constant for all α.








Figure 2: The investor’s percentage certainty equivalent loss, ∆C/C, (relative to the
ﬁrst best certainty equivalent wealth), as a function of his risk-tolerance coeﬃcient
1/b, when the manager is oﬀered a quadratic contract.



























28Figure 3: Investor’s expected utility as a function of α for diﬀerent values of κ.T h e
manager and the investor are assumed to have the same risk tolerance coeﬃcient
1/a =1 /b =8 . The vertical lines denote the corresponding optimal third best alpha.
The ﬁrst alpha is equal to 0.50.
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